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ABSTRACT
This work-in-progress paper presents an ensemble-based model
for detecting and mitigating Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attacks, and its partial implementation. The model
utilises network traffic analysis and MIB (Management In-
formation Base) server load analysis features for detecting
a wide range of network and application layer DDoS at-
tacks and distinguishing them from Flash Events. The pro-
posed model will be evaluated against realistic synthetic net-
work traffic generated using a software-based traffic genera-
tor that we have developed as part of this research. In this
paper, we summarise our previous work, highlight the cur-
rent work being undertaken along with preliminary results
obtained and outline the future directions of our work.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [General]: Security and protection (e.g., firewalls);
D.4.6 [Security and Protection]: Invasive software (e.g.,
viruses, worms, Trojan horses); K.6.5 [Security and Pro-
tection]: Unauthorized access (e.g., hacking, phreaking)
General Terms
Security
Keywords
DDoS attacks, Network Traffic Analysis, Flash Events, Mod-
elling, Synthetic Traffic Generation, MIB Data Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
A Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is an explicit attempt
by an attacker to disrupt an on-line service or make it un-
available to its legitimate users by overwhelming the ser-
vice provider (or server) with a large number of requests.
Some of these attacks (‘flooding attacks’) intend to satu-
rate the target server’s network bandwidth while others aim
at consuming the available computing resources like CPU
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
SIN’12, October 25–27, 2012, Jaipur, India
Copyright c© 2012 ACM 978-1-4503-1668-2/12/10 ...$15.00.
and memory. One of the earliest known DoS attacks oc-
curred in 19741 at the Computer-based Education Research
Laboratory (CERL), at the University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign. A novice programmer forced 31 computers in
the laboratory to power-off by exploiting the default config-
uration of PLATO terminals to accept remote ‘exts2’ com-
mands while running TUTOR as the programming language.
The first reported large-scale DoS attack using the public
Internet occurred in 1999 at the University of Minnesota
[9]. In February 2000, popular websites Yahoo, eBay, and
CNN were attacked and flooded with a large number of re-
quests, thereby forcing them off-line and causing huge finan-
cial losses [10].
The focus of our research is the distributed form of DoS
attack known as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS). In
this form of attack an aggregation of geographically scat-
tered compromised machines (or ‘bots’) are controlled by a
bot-master to attack a single victim. This distributed array
of compromised systems is also known as a Botnet. Some
recent targets of DDoS attacks have been in Estonia (2007)
[15], Georgia (2008) [8] and against PayPal (2010-2011)3.
More than a decade since the first attack was reported [9],
and notwithstanding the amount of research done in this
area, DDoS attacks in various guises still exist and continue
to constitute a pernicious threat to the Internet community.
Their attack vectors are continuously evolving and hence the
problem is still far from being completely resolved. Thus, de-
veloping techniques for efficient DDoS attack detection and
mitigation continues to be an active and important area of
research.
Some of the key challenges in developing a practical solu-
tion to the problem are:
• The detection mechanism should be capable of iden-
tifying a variety of network-level and application-level
flooding attacks.
• Any detection mechanism should be capable of initi-
ating real-time or near real-time mitigation strategies
to alleviate the impact of a DDoS attack.
• The evaluation of any proposed solution should be con-
ducted on realistic datasets, either synthetically gen-
erated or publicly available, rather than on commonly
1http://www.platohistory.org/blog/2010/02/perhaps-the-
first-denial-of-service-attack.html
2an ‘ext’ command would make the PLATO terminal, con-
nected to an external peripheral device to lock itself.
3http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/212701/
used decade old datasets like KDD [1] or using DDoS
attack tools like Trinoo, many of which do not work
now without considerable modifications.
• The proposed system should be able to efficiently dif-
ferentiate DDoS attacks from Flash Events which share
a number of characteristics with DDoS attacks [12].
The term Flash Event (FE) is used to refer to a situa-
tion when a large number of legitimate clients concurrently
accesses a web-server, either following a newsworthy event
or when redirected from popular web-sites like Slashdot or
other social media. Both DDoS attacks and FEs are accom-
panied with high levels of incoming traffic, often leading to
Quality-of-Service (QoS) degradation. Therefore, it is im-
portant for any viable DDoS attack detection solution also
to accurately detect FEs and distinguish them from DDoS
attacks as different actions need to be undertaken by the
network administrator upon identification of either.
In this paper we propose a model, the DDoS Detection
and Mitigation Model (henceforth D2M2) to address these
challenges, and present a partial implementation of D2M2
together with a description of what remains to be done.
D2M2 is intended to detect a variety of DDoS attacks and
to distinguish them from FEs. In order to test and evaluate
our model and the techniques we have implemented, we need
also to be able to generate realistic test data because pub-
lic datasets are too limited and have their own limitations
like age, pseudonymized IP addresses, and zero payloads.
Our work on DDoS attack detection is taking place in two
phases: detecting DDoS attacks through the analysis of sim-
ple network traffic properties like source IP’s, and using an
ensemble of network traffic analysis and MIB (Management
Information Base) server load data analysis. Using these two
strategies, we expect not only to be able to detect different
types of network and application-layer based DDoS attacks,
which can go undetected by individual detection techniques,
but also to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs which share
some similar characteristics.
This work-in-progress paper presents the conceptual de-
sign of the proposed model and our work to date in im-
plementing and evaluating a partial prototype. In addition
we describe the current work being undertaken on synthetic
traffic (DDoS attack and FE) generation using a software-
based traffic generator tool and an experimental test-bed,
being developed as a part of this research. The paper also
gives an overview of the work to be done in future towards
the completion of our prototype.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 gives an overview of related work relating to the two
DDoS attack detection strategies used in our work viz. net-
work traffic data analysis, and MIB data analysis. Section
3 presents a conceptual design of the proposed model and
summarises our previous work on network traffic analysis
for DDoS detection and FE classification. Section 4 details
the current work we are undertaking and Section 5 outlines
the future directions of the research work. Finally, Section
6 provides a summary of the work presented in the paper.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The literature suggests that the DDoS attack detection
problem has been viewed broadly from two different direc-
tions: incoming network traffic analysis and MIB data anal-
ysis. While the former encompasses the analysis of different
Figure 1: Ensemble-based DDoS Detection and Mit-
igation Model
network traffic parameters to detect the occurrence of DDoS
attacks, the latter focuses on the statistical analysis of MIB
data gathered from SNMP (Simple Network Management
Protocol) agents. This section of the paper summarises some
of the recent pertinent work done in each of these directions
along with an overview of the research done in differentiating
DDoS attacks from similar looking FEs.
DDoS detection based on network traffic analysis focuses
on either signature-based or anomaly-based analysis of in-
coming and outgoing network traffic. Research presented in
[14] detects DDoS attack traffic by analysing the TCP/IP
packet headers against some pre-defined rules. Jin et. al [11]
present a covariance model using the flags in control fields of
the TCP header to detect SYN flooding attacks. Research
in [20] used statistical analysis of four macro level IP flow
based features: average number of packets per flow, percent-
age of correlative flow, ‘one direction generating speed’ and
‘ports generating speeds’ for filtering DDoS attack traffic.
Peng et.al [18] proposed a historical source IP address based
technique to filter out the attack traffic at the edge router.
The proposed technique maintained a database of the source
IP addresses which completed a three-way TCP handshake.
The IP Address Database (IAD) was used to decide whether
to accept the incoming packets. Only the traffic originating
from source IP addresses present in the IAD were allowed
access. However, the IAD was potentially at-risk of being
corrupted by those source IP’s which had first completed the
TCP handshake but later on participated in the attack.
The other approach for DDoS attack detection relating to
our work is based on analysing MIB data collected via SNMP
agents. Research presented in [21] and [5] used SNMP MIB
statistical data, instead of raw packet data, and proposed
a flooding attack detection mechanism. Their mechanism
used SNMP MIB variables from IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP
groups and a Support Vector Machine (SVM) for classify-
ing attack traffic into TCP-SYN, UDP and ICMP based
flooding attacks. [17] used 16 MIB variables from 6 groups
(System, Interface, IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP) and pro-
posed a threshold-based flooding attack detection mecha-
nism. One of the characteristics observed in literature relat-
ing to SNMP MIB data analysis based DDoS attack de-
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Figure 2: Incoming traffic profile for CAIDA DDoS
attack dataset
tection was the use of a rather constant set of network-
traffic related MIB variables like ipInReceive, tcpAttempt-
Fails, icmpInDestUnreachs etc. Therefore, the techniques
using this set of MIB variables focused only on detecting
network layer flooding attacks like TCP-SYN flood. How-
ever, the proposed D2M2 aims to detect application layer
flooding attacks, in addition to the network layer flooding
attacks, for which it uses server-load based MIB variables
i.e. CPU and memory utilisation.
A majority of the attack detection techniques focus on
DDoS attacks without taking FEs into account, although
FEs share some similar characteristics with DDoS attacks.
Some of the approaches which do consider FEs, tag them
as an abnormal activity without differentiating them from
DDoS attacks. FEs originate from legitimate clients as op-
posed to DDoS attacks which usually come from compro-
mised machines, so one current research challenge is to dif-
ferentiate activity generated by humans from that generated
by (compromised) machines.
Amongst some of the techniques available to address this
challenge are graphical puzzles or CAPTCHA’s which have
been rather heavily used. Research in [13] used these puz-
zles to propose a system to protect web-servers based on
probabilistic authentication. Use of CAPTCHA’s however
introduces additional delays for legitimate clients when ac-
cessing websites. Research presented in [12, 16] proposed
methods to distinguish DDoS attacks from FEs. However,
their research was based on datasets not available in the
public domain thus making it difficult to validate their re-
sults. In our previous work, we analysed some publicly avail-
able datasets and present three parameters which could be
used to differentiate DDoS attacks from FEs [7], and subse-
quently proposed a server-side model of FEs [6] with a view
to generating realistic FE traffic.
3. WORK TO DATE
In this section we present our model and summarise the
work completed so far towards its implementation. In addi-
tion to developing the model, the work to date has mainly
focused on network traffic analysis based DDoS detection,
its differentiation from similar looking FEs and modelling
FEs to facilitate their synthetic traffic generation.
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Figure 3: New Source IP addresses for CAIDA
DDoS attack dataset
3.1 DDoS Detection and Mitigation Model
In order to accurately identify a wide variety of network
and application layer DDoS attacks and mitigate their ef-
fect, we propose a DDoS Detection and Mitigation Model
(D2M2). The proposed model uses an an ensemble of two
different DDoS attack detection strategies: network traffic
analysis based DDoS detection and MIB (server-load) data
analysis based DDoS detection. The combination of these
two strategies is expected not only to detect a wide range of
DDoS attacks which can go undetected by individual strat-
egy used in isolation, but also to be able to differentiate
DDoS attacks from similar looking FEs. Figure 1 presents
a conceptual design of our proposed model.
3.2 DDoS Attack Detection using IP Addresses
A popular dataset utilized by DDoS researchers has been
the CAIDA “DDoS Attack 2007” Dataset [2] which contains
approximately one hour of pseudonymized traffic traces from
a DDoS attack on August 4, 2007 (20:50:08 UTC to 21:56:16
UTC). The characteristics of this attack in terms of traffic
and previously unseen or new source IP addresses are pre-
sented in Figures 2 and 3 respectively. Figure 3 shows a
dramatic increase in the number of previously unseen IP ad-
dresses at the commencement of the attack. This has moti-
vated one of the key questions identified for building the pro-
posed D2M2: How accurately can the onset of a DDoS attack
be detected using simple incoming network traffic properties
like source IP’s? In order to address this research question,
we proposed a DDoS detection algorithm using ‘source IP
address’ as the analysis parameter [3]. The proposed attack
detection algorithm comprised of two main functions:
• ipac function for classifying source IP addresses, and
• ddos function for identifying high-rate flooding attacks
The ipac or IP address classification function extracts the
source IP address information from the incoming network
traffic and determines whether the source IP address has
been seen previously or is new (Not Seen Previously - NSP).
In order to perform this classification, ipac maintains two
lists of source IP addresses: W (White-list) and R (Recent).
The list W is initialised with the source IP’s of known attack-
free or normal traffic and the list R is used to temporarily
hold the NSP source IP’s and copy them to W once it has
been determined that the system is no longer under attack.
R is used to avoid polluting the white-list.
The ddos function maintains two states: A (under attack)
and NA (not under attack). The ddos function is invoked at
regular time-intervals to analyse the rate of incoming packets
from NSP source IP’s. It uses Cumulative Sum Algorithm
(CUSUM) to detect the abrupt changes in the rate of in-
coming packets, based on which it determines the change of
state from NA to A or vice-versa. Bit vectors are used to
implement lists W and R used in the algorithm. Currently,
the NSP algorithm has been implemented for IPv4 (232) ad-
dress space and requires 0.5 GB of storage space. Figure 4
gives a diagrammatic representation of the NSP algorithm.
Our previous work [3] proposes a technique for detecting
high-rate flooding attacks using source IP’s and presents a
proof of concept implementation using bit vectors. The pa-
per shows how a simple network traffic parameter can be
used to effectively detect high-rate flooding attacks. One
of the limitations identified in our approach is the fact that
when the system is under attack all the new source IP’s
are treated as malicious. This can potentially give rise to
false positives. Our future work will attempt to address this
limitation by extending the rejection criterion beyond NSP
source IP’s. The further work will also attempt to use more
features such as the distribution of IP’s for detecting DDoS
attacks.
3.3 Parametric Differences Between DDoS At-
tacks and FEs
DDoS attacks can often be mistaken for FEs since both
of them share various similar characteristic features. There-
fore, it is important to accurately detect DDoS events and to
distinguish them from FEs. Preliminary work done in this
direction attempts to address the related research question:
In what circumstances and how precisely can we distinguish
between a DDoS attack and a FE?
Research presented in [7] addresses this question by analysing
two publicly available datasets, each representing a real-
world DDoS attack (CAIDA ‘DDoS Attack 2007’ Dataset
[2]) and an FE (‘1998 FIFA World Cup’ Dataset [4]), and
proposes a set of parameters which could potentially be used
to separate the two network activities i.e. DDoS attacks and
FEs. The proposed parameters, though not entirely orthog-
onal, are capable of capturing different aspects of network
traffic, which can then help in distinguishing DDoS attacks
from FEs. The three proposed parameters are:
1. Change in rate of incoming traffic
2. Change in rate of new source IP addresses
3. Distribution of requests among source IP addresses
The rationale behind the first parameter is that in case
of a DDoS attack the participating machines or bots are
programmed to send packets at pre-defined rates. In order
to maximise the intended damage the bots are concurrently
triggered by the bot-master and instructed to send traffic
in huge volumes. This characteristic traffic pattern differs
from a FE where it takes a finite amount of time for the
news to spread across the web community. Hence, the rate
of incoming traffic, as observed by the target server, is not
as dramatic as in case of a DDoS attack and thus could be
could be used as one of the differentiating features.
Figure 4: DDoS Detection using NSP source IP’s
The second proposed parameter (change in rate of new
source IP’s) is based on a recent research which shows that
a typical size of a Botnet’s live population (number of active
bots) is often limited to a few thousand machines [19]. As
each bot has limited capabilities, in order to create the de-
sired impact they are simultaneously activated by the bot-
master. This leads to an abrupt change in the previously
unseen source IP’s by the victim with the onset of the at-
tack. This relatively small and finite set of available bots
(as compared to the number of legitimate clients in a FE)
forces their re-use during the course of the attack resulting
in a minimal or no change in the rate of new source IP’s as
observed by the victim. This characteristic differs from a
FE scenario where the spread of news brings ‘new’ clients
on-line to access the information and hence the target server
continuously experiences new source IP’s.
The final parameter is based on the argument that during
a DDoS attack, as the attacker attempts to maximise the
utilisation of the finite available resources, it often forces
each bot to send large amounts of traffic. Thus, the num-
ber of packets per bot is high and the entire outgoing traf-
fic is more or less evenly distributed amongst participat-
ing bots. Whereas during a FE, barring some enthusiastic
clients, most clients are only usually interested in informa-
tion specific to the event. Therefore, comparatively fewer
requests originate from each client during a FE as opposed
to a DDoS attack. Thus, a distribution of requests amongst
clients could be another distinguishing parameter between
DDoS attacks and FEs.
In our previous work [7] we analysed two publicly avail-
able datasets and proposed a set of parameters (change in
rate of incoming traffic, change in rate of new source IP
addresses, and distribution of requests among source IP ad-
dresses) which, in conjunction, could be used to efficiently
differentiate between DDoS attacks and FEs.
3.4 Modelling Flash Events
Even though our previous work [7] identified a set of pa-
rameters which could possibly differentiate DDoS attacks
and FEs, the problem of having real FE datasets for testing
and evaluating the D2M2 was yet to be resolved. A very
limited number of FE datasets are available in the public
domain. Moreover, a majority of these datasets are web-
server logs in Common Log Format (CLF) which makes it
difficult to replay them over the network for experimenta-
tion purposes. Our approach to address this problem i.e.
lack of FE datasets, was to model FEs and use that model
to generate synthetic FE traffic closely approximating the
real-world scenarios.
We present our work in this regard in [6] in which we
present a detailed study of FEs and their classification into
three broad categories: predictable, unpredictable and sec-
ondary. In that work, we describe a FE according to three
key components: the volume of incoming traffic, the related
source IP’s and the accessed resources, and use them to pro-
pose a server-side model for FEs.
We consider a FE to comprise of two major phases: a
flash-phase and a decay-phase and argue the near absence
of any sustained or plateau traffic phase. We use the incom-
ing traffic volume component, its increase and subsequent
decrease, to propose a simple exponential model. Our anal-
ysis also shows that during a FE, the variation in source IP’s
closely resembles the variations in incoming traffic volume.
This resemblance is based on our observation that the over-
all increase in incoming traffic during a FE is mainly due to
a substantial increase in the interested clients rather than
to an increase in the number of requests per client.
Another key observation presented in our paper [6] that
could potentially be used to detect FEs and distinguish them
from DDoS attacks was the randomness of the accessed re-
sources. This characteristic was based on the speculation
that during a FE, most clients are interested in specific infor-
mation related to that event. Thus, the number of distinct
web-resources being accessed during a FE should be lower as
compared to the non-flash-event times. One way to measure
this characteristic is using Shannon’s entropy, a measure of
uncertainty associated with a random variable. In our anal-
ysis, a unique web-resource represented the random variable
for calculating the resource-entropy. The analysis of a pub-
lic domain dataset, presented in the paper, confirmed our
speculation.
Our previous work [6] presents a FE model using a small
set of configurable parameters and validates the proposed
model using some publicly available datasets representing
different types of FEs. The proposed mathematical model,
including the resource-entropy characteristic is currently be-
ing used to generate realistic FE traffic.
4. CURRENT WORK
Realistic network traffic, for both DDoS attacks and FEs,
is essential for testing and evaluating our proposed model
and its implementation. As with FEs, very few datasets
representing real DDoS attacks are available in the public
domain, mainly due to the associated legal and privacy is-
sues. Our proposed solution to this problem is synthetic
traffic generation. The current work being undertaken is
aimed at addressing this essential requirement and in the
process finding a suitable answer to the research question:
How can the network traffic be parameterised and syntheti-
cally generated to closely approximate the real-world traffic?
4.1 Synthetic Traffic Generation
Some of the key network traffic characteristics identified
for testing and evaluating the proposed D2M2 are: firstly,
since the source IP address has been identified as one of
the key parameters which would be used to detect DDoS
attacks and separate them from FEs, the packets in the net-
Figure 5: Test-bed architecture
work traffic should cover a wide spectrum of source IP’s.
Secondly, the proposed D2M2 would correlate the network
traffic analysis with the MIB server load data analysis for
detecting DDoS attacks. Therefore, it is important that the
packets have a valid source and destination IP address to
ensure that a valid TCP-level connection is established be-
tween the host and the target. And finally, for emulating
real-world application-level attacks and FEs, it is required
that the packets contain valid data. An additional require-
ment identified as a part of synthetic traffic generation is
that the transmission pattern of the synthetic data should
be a controllable mix of ‘normal and attack’ traffic for an
efficient evaluation of D2M2.
To generate network traffic with aforementioned charac-
teristics, the experimentation began with some widely ref-
erenced open source traffic generation tools like D-ITG4,
hping5. However, it was discovered that most of these tools
were not designed for generating DDoS attack and FE traffic
with the characteristics required for our research. Moreover,
most of these tools were written some years ago and thus re-
quired modifications.
Another option explored for generating synthetic network
traffic with the desired characteristics was to use IP-aliasing
combined with the GNU Wget tool6. IP aliasing is a well-
known technique, available on most computing platforms,
for assigning a large number of distinct IP’s to a single
hardware (Network Interface Card or NIC) address. Wget
is a command line utility for retrieving files using HTTP,
HTTPS and FTP protocol. Thus, using IP-aliasing with
Wget could potentially create an appearance of a set of
‘bots’ or ’legitimate clients’, each one with a valid source
IP and hardware address, to be used for emulating realistic
DDoS attacks and FEs respectively. This approach how-
ever lacked the required scalability and was also heavy on
host-machines’ available resources.
The idea of using IP-aliasing with Wget however formed
the basis of a software-based traffic generator, Botloader,
developed as a part of this research. Botloader uses low-
level system calls to Linux kernel for creating IP aliases and
binds them to the NIC. Each ‘bot’ (aliased IP) has its own
4http://www.grid.unina.it/software/ITG/
5http://www.hping.org/
6http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/
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Figure 6: Synthetic FE (1st Semi-final) data: incom-
ing traffic volume
unique IP address and a network socket, and has access to
a set of shared libraries, each representing a different attack
type, and responds to commands specified in configuration
file. At present, libraries for PING, TCP-SYN, UDP, and
HTTP based attacks and FE traffic have been developed.
Experimental Set-up
The experimental test-bed consists of 10 host machines host-
ing ‘bots’ (for DDoS attacks) or ‘legitimate clients’ (for FEs),
controlled by a control machine and collectively sending traf-
fic to a target server. The control machine acts like a ‘mas-
ter’ and issues commands to initiate instances of Botloader
in each of the participating hosts. All the machines in the
attack network are connected via a 1 gigabit per second
(Gbps) link to a layer 3 switch, which is further connected
to the target machine via a 10 Gbps link. All the traffic
coming from the attack network gets accumulated and is
sent through the 10 Gbps link directly connected to the tar-
get machine. All the machines, except the target server, are
standard PCs with 3.0 GHz Intel Core2 processors, 4 GB of
memory and an integrated 1 Gigabit (Gb) network interface
card. They are running Ubuntu 10.04 Desktop as the oper-
ating system (OS) and are connected via Dell PowerConnect
6224 switch. The target server is a Dell PowerEdge R710
with two Six-core Intel Xeon 2.27 GHz processors (hyper-
threaded) and 32 GB of memory. It runs on Ubuntu 10.04
(Server) and uses Apache2 as the web-server.
In our initial configuration of the test-bed, all the ports
of the attackers and the target were directly connected to
the switch, and packets were redirected via layer 2 switching.
Each of the 10 host machines was configured with 6,400 bots
with aliased source IPs bound to the host hardware (MAC)
address. Each of the 64,000 bots were assigned a unique
source IP address within the class B IPv4 address space.
Having all the host machines in a single VLAN in a class B
IPv4 address space, enforced a theoretical maximum on the
number of usable source IPs to close to 64,000.
Problems with this design soon surfaced when we tried
to run the FE-emulation. The switch was designed to han-
dle up to 896 IP-addresses, but we were flooding it with
traffic from 64,000, because this closely mimicked the num-
ber of IP addresses in the original data (79,033). This also
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Figure 7: Synthetic FE (1st Semi-final) data: differ-
ent source IPs
led to the target server having to maintain an ARP-table
of 64,000, since without an entry to map the IP-address of
outgoing packets to the required MAC-address, the destina-
tion of each packet would be unknown. This slowed down
the server to the point where the overall traffic flow could
not keep pace with the required emulation of nearly 4,000
requests per second at its peak. The experimental setup
was changed and the network was divided into two separate
VLANs, one to host the attack machines and one for the
target, shown in Figure 5. In this set-up, the layer 3 switch
was used as a router by enabling the inter VLAN routing.
Preliminary Results
Using the set-up described above, experiments were con-
ducted using Botloader in order to generate synthetic FE
traffic. Traffic around the 1st World Cup Semi-final match
was used for synthetic traffic generation. Statistical analy-
sis was performed on this data to compute parameters like
number of packets, number of different source IPs, number
of different resources accessed and normalised resource en-
tropy per one second of sampling interval. This information
was then used by Botloader to generate synthetic traffic.
Figure 6 compares the original and simulated data for the
incoming traffic volume for the 1st Semi-final match repre-
sented as the number of HTTP GET requests per second.
The simulated FE traffic closely follows the original traf-
fic however it fells somewhat short of the number of HTTP
GET requests in the original data.
A comparison of the number of different source IPs per
second registered on target server is shown in Figure 7. The
number of different source IPs in the simulated traffic closely
mimics the original FE data, although the total number of
different source IPs seen by the target during the entire sim-
ulation is slightly less than expected. Out of the 64,000 dif-
ferent source IPs assigned to bots, 57,214 were used during
the simulation. This deviation is an experimental artifact
and is currently being researched. Using a larger address
space (IPv4 class A) or configuring each host machine on
a separate VLAN could potentially improve the simulation
results.
During a FE, a majority of the user population is often
interested in a specific set of information related to the event.
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 0  3600  7200  10800  14400  18000  21600
N
u m
b e
r  o
f  d
i f f
e r
e n
t  r
e s
o u
r c
e s
 a
c c
e s
s e
d  
p e
r  s
e c
o n
d
Time (seconds)
original-data
simulated-data
Figure 8: Synthetic FE (1st Semi-final) data: differ-
ent resources accessed
This characteristic transforms to a rather constant request
per client. Therefore, the number of different clients (source
IPs) vary in a similar fashion as the incoming traffic volume,
as seen in Figures 6 and 7
Figure 8 compares the different resources accessed for the
original and synthetically generated FE data. The obtained
results deviate from the original data and needs further in-
vestigation. Figures 7 and 8 have been smoothed using
‘bezier’ technique available in gnuplot.
The preliminary results show that the simulated FE data
closely follows the original data particularly for different
source IPs used for generating synthetic traffic. However,
additional work is required to more closely mimic the in-
coming traffic volume and the resource access pattern of the
original data and further improve the existing results. These
issues are currently being investigated along with synthetic
generation of different types of FEs and DDoS attacks.
5. FUTURE-WORK
Our overall objective for the project is to answer the fol-
lowing challenge: How to use a minimal yet sufficient range
of parameters to reliably detect DDoS attacks and at the
same time mitigate its effects? As a result our future re-
maining work in the project is to complete the prototype
implementation of D2M2. This has been divided into two
main phases: correlating network traffic and MIB data anal-
ysis for detecting DDoS attacks, and mitigating their impact
upon detection. Both the phases are briefly discussed below.
5.1 Ensemble-based DDoS Detection
As the first part of our future work, we aim to address the
research question: How can the network traffic characteris-
tics be correlated with server load (MIB) data to improve the
detection of DDoS attack?
To address this question we propose an ensemble DDoS
detection technique that would combine the two different de-
tection strategies i.e. network traffic analysis based DDoS
detection and MIB data based DDoS attack detection. The
proposed ensemble would correlate network traffic parame-
ters (source IPs, incoming traffic volume, and entropy of re-
sources accessed) with the server load MIB variables (CPU
and memory utilisation) to detect a wide range of network
Figure 9: Deployment architecture of D2M2
and application level DDoS attacks. These parameters would
be correlated using (logical) OR, AND and weighted mean,
and their outcomes would be compared to find an optimal
correlation technique for the proposed parameters. Figure
1 shows an abstract-level description of the ensemble-based
DDoS attack detection.
5.2 DDoS Mitigation
The second part of the future work would aim at incorpo-
rating some DDoS mitigation strategies into the proposed
D2M2. This would address another key requirement of a
workable DDoS attack detection system i.e. How efficiently
a response, in real-time or near real-time, can be activated
to mitigate the impact of a DDoS attack?
Figure 9 gives an off-line deployment architecture of the
proposed D2M2. The incoming network traffic would be
captured using a high-speed Endace DAG 7.5G27 NIC and
fed into the D2M2. This high-speed NIC would ensure a
minimal packet loss and thus enable the real-time or near
real-time detection and mitigation of attacks. DDoS attacks
would be detected using the proposed ensemble-based tech-
nique within the D2M2. Upon identification of a DDoS at-
tack, as a part of the mitigation strategy, D2M2 will generate
a list of ‘white or legitimate’ source IP addresses and will
communicate it to the different network monitoring device
(network and application-aware firewall) being used in the
existing system.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a conceptual model, along-
with the preliminary work done, for detecting and mitigat-
ing DDoS attacks. In the proposed model, an ensemble of
network traffic and MIB server load data analysis is used
to detect DDoS attacks, to differentiate them from similar
looking FEs, and to instigate source IP based mitigation
strategies upon attack identification. The testing and per-
formance evaluation of the proposed model is conducted us-
ing synthetic network traffic, closely representing real-world
DDoS attacks and FE traffic, generated using a software-
based traffic generator developed as a part of this research.
This research was partly supported by the Australia-India
Strategic Research Fund.
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